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Introduction
The Champagne fairs were a cycle of periodic trade fairs held annually from the twelfth century onwards. They took place six times a year and rotated among four towns -Bar-sur-Aube, Lagny, Provins and Troyes -located in the county of Champagne, a polity enjoying extensive internal autonomy until its incorporation into France in 1285. Each fair lasted for about six weeks, followed by a break for merchants to move on to the next fair, so the Champagne fair-cycle constituted an almost continuous market throughout the year, a notable advantage over most other medieval fairs. 1 Although merchants from many countries traded many goods at the Champagne fairs, the core business was the exchange of cloth and wool brought by , 113. 2 Alengry (1915), 13-17, 72-84; Bautier (1953), 143-4; Bloch (1964), 86-7; Braudel (1979), 3:93; Braudel (1981) , 419; Chapin (1937), 13; De Roover (1948), 11-12; ; Munro (2001), 14-16; Pirenne (1936) , 100-03. 3 Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990) . 4 Greif (2006a) , 100, 315, 317, 333, 336. fairs were carried out in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 5 and even the most recent empirical accounts date back to the 1970s. 6 The time is thus ripe for a renewed examination of the historical evidence on these fairs and a critical assessment of any lessons they might hold for economic development.
2. The Ascendancy of the Fairs and 'Generalized' Institutional Provision What explains the outstanding success of the Champagne fairs in attracting and mediating international trade in the medieval Commercial Revolution? Champagne had periodic fairs from at least the early twelfth century, although initially they enjoyed no international importance. Between 1137 and 1164, merchants from Flanders, Arras, and many parts of the kingdom of France began to attend fairs in Champagne, and by 1174 they had been joined by Italians. 7 By 1190 Italian merchants were visiting Champagne in significant numbers and the annual cycle of six fairs was well established. 8 On this basis, the beginning of the Champagne fairs' European preeminence is usually taken to be about 1180. During the first half of the thirteenth century the volume and sophistication of business at the fairs increased as international merchants attended in ever greater numbers. At least until c. 1260, scholars are universally agreed that the Champagne fairs were in their ascendancy, both as an emporium for the trade in wares and as the 'money-market of Europe'.
How can this ascendancy be explained?
The policies of the counts of Champagne played a major role in the rise of the fairs.
The counts had an interest in ensuring the success of the fairs, which brought in very significant revenues. 9 These revenues in turn enabled the counts to consolidate their political position by rewarding allies and attracting powerful vassals. 10 As a result, the counts were willing to provide various institutional mechanisms needed for the successful operation of an international fair, and were able to avoid selling privileges to special interest-groups that would have limited trade. 11 The first institutional service provided by the counts of Champagne consisted of mechanisms for ensuring security of the persons and property rights of traders. The counts undertook early, focused and comprehensive action to ensure the safety of merchants travelling to and from the fairs, and were unusual among medieval fairauthorities in devoting considerable political and military resources to extending this guarantee beyond their territorial boundaries. 12 As early as 1148, when moneychangers from Vézelay were robbed on their way to the Provins fair by a French nobleman, Count Thibault II wrote to the regent of France demanding that the moneychangers be compensated and declaring, 'I will not let take place with impunity such an injury, which tends to nothing less than the ruin of my fairs '. 13 In 1149, when another French nobleman seized the goods of merchants travelling to the Champagne fairs, the count wrote again to the French regent demanding justice, saying 'if you wish to chastise him and march against him with an army, let me know: I will assist you in extracting vengeance from him'. 14 By the early thirteenth century, the counts were negotiating formal treaties from neighbouring princes to guarantee safe conduct to visitors to 'their' fairs -in 1209 with France, in 1220 with Burgundy, and in 1232 with Boulogne. 15 Before mid-century, the counts were extending the geographical scope of the safe conduct as far afield as Italy. In 1242-3, when some Italian merchants travelling to the Champagne fairs were kidnapped and robbed in Italy by Piacenzans, the count of Champagne wrote to the Piacenzan authorities threatening to ban all Piacenzan merchants from his fairs unless the victims were compensated. 16 As early as the 1170s, the counts had begun appointing special 'fair-wardens' with policing, regulatory and jurisdictional powers at the fairs, and by the mid-thirteenth century they had empowered these wardens to exert pressure on foreign jurisdictions to enforce the safe conduct of the fairs. 17 In 1283-5, for instance, when a Artois toll-keeper violated the safe conduct by imprisoning an Ypres merchant travelling to the Champagne fairs, the count's fair-wardens threatened to exclude all citizens of Artois from future fairs in retribution. 18 The counts of Champagne also ensured that merchants were secure at the fairs themselves, enforcing property rights through their own law-courts (as we shall see), employing their own officials to police the streets, and cooperating with municipal and ecclesiastical officials to guarantee security in the fair-towns. 19 Alengry argues that the creation by the 1170s of dedicated fair-wardens made an important contribution to the ascendancy of the fairs 'because the wardens were independent of the tyrannies and subjections of the local prévôté, since they depended solely on the sovereign'. 20
A second institutional service provided by the rulers of Champagne was contractenforcement. The counts of Champagne operated a four-tiered system of public lawcourts which judged lawsuits and officially witnessed contracts with a view to subsequent enforcement. The highest princely court in Champagne was the Jours de Troyes, a tribunal which judged important cases as a court of first instance and also heard appeals from lower courts. The second tier of the princely justice-system consisted of the courts of the four baillis (bailiffs) which judged cases involving highstatus parties such as nobles, religious houses, and foreign merchants. The third tier consisted of the courts of the prévôts (provosts), numbering 54 in 1285, who as representatives of the prince rendered justice to commoners. The lowest tier of the princely justice-system consisted of village courts operated by maires (mayors), officials appointed by the prévôt to render justice to the inhabitants of each village.
Towns, in contrast to villages, were subject to the direct jurisdiction of the local bailli or prévôt, unless they managed to obtain commune privileges. These entitled a town to have a mayor and 12 échevins (aldermen), appointed by the prince, with jurisdiction over cases involving urban inhabitants although also open to outsiders. After Champagne became part of France in 1285, the French crown retained this four-tiered 18 , 295, 303-04. 19 Bourquelot (1839-40), I:119; , II:20, 219-20; Laurent (1935), 279-80; , 228-32. 20 Alengry (1915), 108. structure of courts in the territory, but superimposed the Parlement de Paris as a final court of appeal. 21 Cases involving foreign merchants could be adjudicated at most levels of this public legal system. For the most serious cases, according to Alengry, 'the count as sovereign was directly employed in person in ensuring justice was rendered to visitors to the fairs who had suffered injury'. 22 This long-standing princely provision of justice to visiting merchants, dating back to the twelfth century, was explicitly confirmed and extended in 1245 when the count granted Roman, Tuscan, Lombard and Provençal merchants frequenting the St Ayoul fair in Provins the privilege of being subject solely to the count's own direct jurisdiction or (in his absence) to that of the count's immediate deputy. 23 Less serious conflicts involving merchants at the fairs were judged by the princely bailli or prévôt. 24 At each fair a temporary wooden lodge was erected, from which the prévôt dispensed civil and criminal justice. 25 The first record of this lodge dates from 1176, when count Henri assigned to the churchwardens of St Quiriace 'the wood from the lodges of the prévôts at the fairs'. 26 Further detail is provided by the Provins communal charter of 1252, which alluded to the lodges of the prévôts at the fairs and declared that 'the merchants who come to the fairs shall be judged by us [the count] and our people: that is, by the fair-wardens, or by the bailli, or by a person whom he shall set in his place'. 27 A subsequent Provins charter of 1268 also mentions the lodges of the prévôts at the fairs, and confirms that 'foreign merchants and our Jews shall remain within our protection and in our justice'. 28 A 1324 conflict between the royal prévôt and the abbot of Lagny over the fair jurisdiction confirmed the continued jurisdiction of the princely prévôt at the Champagne fairs into the fourteenth century. 29 By the 1170s, as mentioned above, the counts of Champagne had supplemented ordinary public legal provision at the fairs by appointing special officials called fairwardens (gardes des foires). 30 They were first recorded in 1174, when they were required to proclaim a regulation about weights and measures at the start of each fair. 31 By the 1220s at latest, the fair-wardens were operating a continual court throughout the duration of each fair, at which merchants could register commercial contracts and unpaid creditors could bring complaints. The first recorded case of a merchant contract being witnessed by the fair-wardens dates from 1225, at which point the wardens were still using their own personal seals. 32 At some periods, as in Provins in 1228, the same man was both fair-warden and princely bailli, and it is unclear in which capacity he was judging which cases. 33 By 1247, the fair-wardens were witnessing merchant contracts using an official fair seal. 34 In 1252, the fair-wardens were operating alongside the princely baillis in dispensing justice to foreign merchants at the Provins fairs. 35 Bautier argues that until c. 1260, the wardens' jurisdictional purview was still limited, since merchant contracts more frequently bore ecclesiastical than fairwardens' seals. 36 However, merchants did not record all debts at the fairs using sealed contracts. Many sales, particularly of cloth, were made on short-term credit, which was recorded by money-changers or notaries, or simply agreed before witnesses. 37 Defaults on such debts could be referred to the fair-wardens even when the original contracts had not been sealed by the wardens. 38 By the 1260s, the fair-wardens possessed powers of confiscation, fining, and incarceration, and by the 1270s were declaring their mandate to ensure everywhere the fulfillment of any contract issued at the fairs, 'in the name of the count of Champagne '. 39 But public alternatives to the princely court system did exist, and this was another strength of contract enforcement at the Champagne fairs, since jurisdictional competition created incentives for courts to provide impartial judgments. For one 30 Goldschmidt (1891), 229-30. 31 Arbois de Jubainville and Pigeotte (1859-66) , III:235-6, 367; Bautier (1953), 118. 32 Bautier (1953), 118-19. 33 Chapin (1937), 126. 34 Bautier (1953), 118-19. 35 Bourquelot (1839-40) , II:409. 36 Bautier (1953), 119, 122-3. 37 , 119-20. 38 , 26-9. 39 Bautier (1952), 320. thing, three of the Champagne fair-towns (Provins, Bar-sur-Aube, and Troyes) had privileges as communes entitling them to operate municipal mayoral courts during this period. 40 Sometimes, as in Troyes in 1231 or Provins in 1270-9, the same man was both town mayor and princely fair-warden, and it is difficult to distinguish in which capacity he exercised jurisdiction in particular cases. 41 The Provins charter of 1252 stated that merchants at the fairs were to be judged by the count and his officials, but left foreign traders the option of using municipal courts: 'and if it pleases them to seek law in front of the mayor, the mayors have the liberty and power to do so ... and the fines from the foreign merchants shall go to the commune up to 20 sols, and the surplus shall be ours'. In apparent recognition of this joint jurisdiction, the 1252 charter stated that 'the mayors and commune shall have, at the fairs of Provins, their lodge on the pavement alongside that of the prévôt'. 42 The 1268 Provins charter also stated firmly that foreign merchants were under princely jurisdiction, but also gave them the option of bringing cases to the municipal jurisdiction, and confirmed that the lodge of the mayoral court at the fairs should be located beside that of the prévôt. 43 How effective were municipal courts in providing the impartial contract-enforcement necessary for international trade? The strongest evidence for their effectiveness is that long-distance merchants chose to use them. According to both Bourquelot and Bautier, municipal courts in Champagne did judge lawsuits at the fairs, and foreign merchants at the fairs sometimes voluntarily chose to use them even though princely courts were available. 44 In 1278, for instance, a Florentine merchant appeared before the Provins mayoral court declaring that he and his associates had received payment on a fairdebt. 45 Visiting merchants evidently used the municipal courts sufficiently often to increase their caseload since, as Bourquelot discovered, the Provins town accounts 'abound in details concerning expenditures of the commune on the occasion of the fairs', including the costs of carrying benches into the mayor's judicial lodge. 46 Further evidence of the attractiveness of municipal courts to foreign merchants is 40 In Bar-sur-Aube, c.1179 -c.1260 in Provins, 1230 in Provins, -1335 in Troyes, 1230 -1242 . See Bourquelot (1865 Bautier (1952), 318-19; Arbois de Jubainville (1859), 18-30; Tardif (1855) ; Terrasse (2005), 45, 57, 61-3, 69-70, 77-9, 164, 215, 219, 232. 41 , 126-33. 42 Bourquelot (1839-40) , II:409. 43 Bourquelot (1839-40) , II:416. 44 Bourquelot (1839-40), I:210; , II:19-20; Bautier (1952) , 318-19. 45 Davidsohn (1896 Davidsohn ( -1901 , 30. 46 , II:20. provided by repeated jurisdictional rivalries between town courts and the princely prévots and fair-wardens, some serious enough to come to the Grand Jours de Troyes. 47 The mayoral courts held frequent sittings -sometimes as many as 46 sessions annually -and had strong incentives to offer attractive judicial services to foreign merchants since court fees were the communes' sole regular source of revenues. 48 The church provided an additional set of public law-courts offering contract enforcement to merchants at the fairs. 49 A charter of 1153 granted the Priory of St Ayoul high and low justice over the entire town and lordship of Provins for the first seven days of the annual autumn fair, suspending all other jurisdictions (both princely and municipal), and ordering the counts' officials to swear obedience to the priory during the seven days of its fair-jurisdiction. 50 The priory's tribunal, manned by a bailiff, his deputy, a public prosecutor, and a clerk of the court, held daily sittings in a chamber in the monastery buildings and was known for the swiftness of its judgments and the modesty of its fees. Superficially, this jurisdiction might seem unimportant, since it lasted only a week and excluded the fair's core sales period. But the commercial and judicial activities of the Champagne fairs operated continuously throughout the year, so the priory's tribunal could judge any business left over from previous fairs. 51 Certainly, the priory's tribunal was popular among merchants and enjoyed such a volume of business that it customarily prolonged its sittings up to midnight on the final day of its jurisdiction, before the princely jurisdiction took over the next morning. The priory's jurisdiction at the Provins autumn fair was repeatedly confirmed by rulers of Champagne over the centuries. 52 A second ecclesiastical tribunal was provided by the abbey of St Pierre, which exercised jurisdiction during the three days of cloth-selling at the Lagny fairs held each January. 53 During these three days, the abbots' bailiff judged all conflicts 47 Arbois de Jubainville and Pigeotte (1859-66), VI:104; Bourquelot (1865), I:210, II:196; Terrasse (2005), 45, 57, 61-3, 69-70, 77-9, 164, 192, 215, 219, 232. 48 Terrasse (2005), 70, 211, 227. 49 Goldschmidt (1891), 229-30; Bassermann (1911), 4-5; Davidsohn (1896 Davidsohn ( -1901 Bautier (1953), 123-4; , 78. 50 Bourquelot (1839-40), I:117-19, 210, 408; , 114. 51 , 113. 52 Bourquelot (1839-40) , I:117-19; , 114. 53 , II:24-5; Alengry (1915), 113. (including criminal ones) without right of appeal, so long as they were not reserved for the princely fair-wardens. 54 This church jurisdiction was of central importance, since the core business of each fair was conducted on its cloth-trading days. The abbey regarded its fair-jurisdiction as extremely important, conserved it jealously, and repeatedly engaged in jurisdictional conflicts with the princely prévôt. 55 Security and contract-enforcement may have been the most important institutional services provided by the counts of Champagne -or devolved to municipal or ecclesiastical institutions -to support the fairs. But they were not the only ones. The counts also provided infrastructure, loan guarantees, and constraints on local merchants' privileges, all of which contributed to the fairs' success.
The counts made major contributions, both directly and indirectly, to commercial infrastructure for merchants visiting the fairs. The counts erected fortifications around the fair towns and roads connecting them, and built canals from the Seine into the fairtown of Troyes. 56 The Hôtel-Dieu was founded in Provins around 1157-60 by the count to expand accommodation for visiting merchants. 57 By granting concessions on market dues, the counts mobilized other organizations, especially ecclesiastical ones, to provide infrastructure for merchants in the form of accommodation, warehousing, and selling space. 58 The counts also encouraged investment in fair infrastructure, Terrasse argues, by granting burghers free rights to transact in real property, as shown by numerous private transactions in property in the fair-zones as early as the twelfth century. 59 The counts further facilitated the development of the fairs as money markets by guaranteeing the security of loans merchants made at the fairs to creditors from whom obtaining payment might be difficult because of high status or privileged legal position. In 1221, for instance, the countess of Flanders and Hainaut borrowed a large sum at the Champagne fairs, and a condition of the loan was that the count of Champagne would ban Flemish and Hainaut merchants from his fairs if the countess 54 , II:24-5. 55 , II:440 (#6764), 551 (#7394). 56 , I: 62, 311; , 108-12; , 54. 57 , 112. 58 , 116. 59 , 23-5.
of Flanders failed to repay. 60 In 1224-5, a group of Sienese merchants at the Champagne fairs refused to lend 3000 livres to an abbey without a guarantee from the count. 61 The period between 1210 and 1250 saw numerous loans issued at the Champagne fairs by foreign merchants to princes, nobles and religious houses in which the count of Champagne used his political power to guarantee repayment. 62 A final reason for the success of the Champagne fair-cycle was that it offered an almost continuous market for merchandise and financial services throughout the year, like a great trading city, but without the most severe disadvantage of medieval citiesspecial privileges for locals that discriminated against foreign merchants. 63 As Alengry points out, had the Champagne fair-towns had strong communal privileges favouring a local patriciate of rich commercial families, 'the clientele of the Champagne fairs would certainly not have benefited: the comital authorities were independent because they were disinterested from any business rivalry, by contrast with townsmen who, whether or not they were local merchants, were competitors against the fairclientele'. 64 This lack of discrimination in favour of locals arose partly from the fact that the four Champagne fair-towns were not great centres of international trade before the fairs arose, and thus did not have powerful groups of indigenous merchants lobbying for privileges. 65 But it was also caused by the fact that the counts of Champagne refrained from granting such privileges even once the fairs began to operate as continuous international markets. Bourquelot and Alengry ascribe this policy to the general weakness of 'communal' privileges in the Champagne region, especially compared to neighbouring France. 66 But such weakness was surely endogenous, and Chapin probably gets closer to the truth by pointing out that the fairs made the counts wealthy, freeing them from the need to sell privileges to the fairtowns and their elites. 67 For whatever reason, at least under the counts the Champagne fairs offered the unique combination of a continuous international trading forum with no institutional discrimination for or against any group of merchants -although this policy changed under the kings of France, as we shall see shortly.
The ascendancy of the Champagne fairs was thus strongly favoured by the policies of the political authorities. The counts of Champagne provide a vivid example of the importance of the political authorities in providing the minimal requirements for market-based economic activity to flourish. They guaranteed security, property rights and contract enforcement, they built infrastructure, they regulated weights and measures, they supported foreign merchant lenders against politically powerful debtors, and they provided a level playing field between foreign merchants and locals.
The distinguishing characteristic of all these institutional services was that the counts provided them not as particularized privileges granted to specific merchant guilds or communities, but rather as generalized institutional guarantees issued 'to all merchants, merchandise, and all manner of persons coming to the fair'. 68 They were then maintained and extended by a princely ruler in the interests of protecting 'his fairs' as a piece of property that delivered a valuable stream of revenues.
The Decline of the Fairs and 'Particularized' Institutional Provision
If the Champagne fairs enjoyed this fortunate combination of institutional services, then why did they ultimately lose their ascendancy over international trade in medieval Europe? Examining the decline of the Champagne fairs casts further light on the sources of their earlier success.
A first issue relates to the timing of the fairs' decline. Bautier argued that the fairs began to decline as merchandise markets soon after the middle of the thirteenth century, while retaining their role as money markets until the early fourteenth century. 69 Much conventional wisdom follows this assessment, so it is important to examine its empirical basis. 70 Bautier bases his conclusion about the timing of decline solely on two documents of 1262 and 1320 which show Italian merchants obtaining funds at the Champagne fairs for cloth purchases actually undertaken in Flemish and French textile centres rather than at the fairs. From this he concludes that by 1262 the fairs had already begun to decline as merchandise markets. 71 But these Italians' visits to textile centres in 1262 can only be interpreted as evidence of decline if we have evidence that Italian merchants frequenting the fairs had never visited textile centres in the pre-1262 period. There is no such evidence: what we observe in 1262 may have been standard practice. Furthermore, Bautier's conclusion does not take account of the fact that in 1262 Flemish merchants had decided not to visit the fairs because they had been maltreated by the customs collector at Bapaume, the toll-station they were legally obliged to pass on their way to Champagne. 72 Italian merchants could well have been purchasing cloth directly in Flanders in 1262 in response to this temporary Flemish boycott, rather than because the fairs were already in decline as merchandise markets.
By contrast, Bautier's two documents reveal clear differences between 1262 and 1320.
In 1262, the Italian merchants buying cloth in textile centres were still bringing it to the Champagne fairs before shipping it to Italy. This suggests that in the 1260s the Italian merchants still treated the fairs as their main base for the cloth trade even when they obtained the cloth in other places. In 1320, by contrast, the cloth purchased was neither bought at the Champagne fairs nor dispatched from them; only the finance was arranged there. 73 If Bautier's two documents show anything, therefore, it is not that decline had already started in 1262, but that it intervened sometime between then and 1320.
Additional evidence casts doubt on the idea that by the 1260s the merchandising operations at the fairs were in decline and only the financial business survived. For one thing, this claim would imply that merchants attending the fairs after 1260 were specialist financiers with little interest in merchandise trade. But Bassermann shows that 'almost all the Italian firms -with the exception of the Romans -which played a decisive role on the money-market [at the Champagne fairs] were also present in the 71 , 133-5. 72 Bourquelot (1865), I:195; , I:50 (#559); Finot (1894), 26-7, 179-86. 73 , 133-5. merchandise trade'. 74 Sayous, too, notes that the Italians who frequented the Champagne fairs traded in both merchandise and money rather than specializing in one or the other. 75 Blomquist reaches a similar conclusion for the Lucchese at the fairs. 76 In the absence of specialization in financial business by Italians at the fairs between 1260 and 1320, it is difficult to see how the merchandise trade could have declined from 1260 onwards while the fairs remained a prosperous international financial market.
Notarial documents from Genoa and Marseilles, moreover, reveal a diametrically opposite trajectory in the merchandise trade at the Champagne fairs. Doehaerd's study of Genoese notarial registers finds that the merchandise trade between Genoa and the fairs shows a marked recrudescence starting around 1250; she concludes that it remained lively until at least 1300. 77 Face's study of notarial documents from Genoa and Marseilles shows a 'truly huge scale participation of the merchants from the northern Italian cities in the caravan trade with Champagne throughout the last three quarters of the thirteenth century'. He concludes that 'while it would … be erroneous to assume that these Italians played no part in the fair trade prior to the second quarter of that century, our evidence does indicate that their activity was much more intensive from that time forward'. 78 Notarial archives thus show the merchandise trade to the Champagne fairs from Italy and Provence increasing, not decreasing, after c. 1250.
Additional evidence inconsistent with the notion of a declining merchandise trade at the fairs after 1260 is provided by the fact that Montpellier, the most important Provençal town trading with the fairs, continued to negotiate treaties with seigneurs on the Rhone river to clear a path for its merchants to ship merchandise to the Champagne fairs, signing a treaty to that effect with the count of Valence and the seigneurs of Montelimar in 1265. 79 As late as 1295, Italian merchants requested an extension of the period during which Flemish merchants displayed their cloths at the Champagne fairs, from three to four days; Bassermann interprets this as indicating an increased volume of cloth-trade between Flemish and Italian merchants at the fairs. 80 So if the fairs continued to flourish as merchandise and money markets long after the 1260s, when did they begin to decline? A quantitative indication is provided by Bourquelot's figures on the tax yield of the fairs, shown in Table 1 . The only fair for which a pre-1275 figure is available, that of Bar-sur-Aube, shows revenues doubling between 1212 and the 1270s, slightly declining in the 1280s, recovering to a peak in Bautier acknowledges that Bourquelot's figures show 1296 to have been the absolute high-point of the fairs, but seeks to cast doubt on their reliability by claiming that they include only the direct yield of the fairs, neglecting revenues from sealing fair-debts, whose increase, he argues, 'must have almost compensated for the (possibly desired) diminution of the [direct yield]'. 81 But as Lefèvre pointed out, the period between the 1280s and the 1320s saw a decline in the fairs' commercial revenues (rentals on halls, stalls and hostels, plus seigneurial dues on the fair-trade) and a rise in their administrative revenues (forfeits and fines, sealing and default fees); he interprets 'the expensiveness of the seal as a particular index of decadence' for the fairs. 82 Furthermore, figures on sealing revenues, assembled in Table 2 , show Bautier's arithmetic to be unfounded. Sealing revenues were minor before 1290, and even at their peak around 1320 were insufficient to bring total revenues of any fair up to its pre-1298 level.
15 (1858), 446, reports 596, probably by including sealing-fees. n Source is document written c. 1310 comparing fair yield in that year with unknown previous period 'before merchants repairing to the fairs of Champagne heard anyone speak of the denier in the livre, or the quarter-denier of brokerage, or the maletouste'. These new taxes were introduced in 1292-6 (see , II: 192-3). Schulte (1900) , 165-6. 86 Bourquelot (1865), II:199 with n. 1. 87 , II:306; Thomas (1977) , 438. 88 , 143-4. 89 Munro (2001) Bautier recognized that the Franco-Flemish conflicts at the end of the thirteenth century damaged the Champagne fairs, but gave two reasons for concluding that they were not the main cause of the fairs' decline. One was his claim that the fairs had 90 , 143. 91 Munro (2001) , 419-24. 92 , 48, 66, 68. 93 Bautier (1953), 118. begun to decline as a market for international trade in merchandise from 1260, so the restrictions on Flemish cloth-merchants' ability to attend the fairs from 1297 onwards cannot have played a major role in the business of the fairs. 94 But, as we have shown,
Bautier's premise that trade in merchandise began to decline from 1260 cannot be sustained: the merchandise trade at the Champagne fairs continued to thrive until at least the 1290s.
Bautier's second reason to reject the role of the war is his contention that as early as Flemish merchants who were unable to make promised payments at the fairs because their goods had been confiscated were then penalized with a fair-ban, prohibiting them from visiting the fairs until they paid their debts. Flemish merchandise was also seized in other parts of France. 97 Schulte (1900), 344-5; , 75-6. 103 Laurent (1935), 118. 104 , 75. 105 , I:186. 106 Strayer (1969), 115-17; Laurent (1935), 119-20; Alengry (1915), 74-5. from French producers to ban the export of raw wool, unfinished woollen cloth, and even the raw materials for dyeing, culminating in the royal export prohibition in 1303, which remained in force until 1360, apart from the single year of 1315. 107 In the early fourteenth century, therefore, the policies of the French state not only restricted the supply of Flemish cloth to the fairs but also prevented the Italian demand for raw wool and cloths at the fairs from being met. Since the cloth trade was a central component of economic activity at the Champagne fairs, these restrictions severely affected the prosperity of the fairs, and thus explain why they were in serious decline by 1315. Milgrom / North / Weingast (1990) , 2 (quotation), 10, 20, and passim. 114 Dixit (2004), 12-13, 47-8, 98-9. 115 Davidson and Weersink (1998) , 565-6. 116 Swedberg (2003) , 12-13. 117 Richman (2004), 2334-5 with n. 15.
transmitting information about the past behaviour of other merchants. Did the Champagne fairs indeed lack public authorities and legal contract enforcement?
The answer is no. As we have seen, the ascendancy of the Champagne fairs as the major fulcrum of international trade in thirteenth-century Europe was sustained by a comprehensive system of public contract-enforcement. The counts of Champagne provided a state legal system which secured property rights and commercial contracts for visiting merchants at multiple levels. Its incentive to provide good services to visiting merchants was enhanced by the competition offered by two other components of the public legal system -the municipal courts of the fair-towns and the ecclesiastical tribunals of local religious houses. In addition, the counts of Champagne set up special public tribunals at the fairs in which contracts could be judged and enforced by princely fair-wardens.
The fair-wardens, counter to their description by Milgrom, North and Weingast as 'private judges', were officials appointed by the counts of Champagne (after 1285 by the kings of France), and their jurisdiction derived from that princely jurisdiction. 118 The fair-wardens' courts were also part of the princely legal system by virtue of litigants' right to appeal against their judgments to higher state courts -the Jours de
Troyes and, after 1285, the Parlement de Paris. 119 In 1287, for instance, several burghers of Châlons-sur-Marne appealed to the Parlement de Paris against a seizure of cloths mandated by the Champagne fair-wardens. 120 In 1296, the city of Milan appealed to the Parlement de Paris against a fair-ban imposed by the wardens. 121 In 1306, a Genoese merchant appealed to the Parlement de Paris against a decision of the fair-wardens dismissing his demand for payment from another Italian merchant. 122 In 1310, a merchant sentenced by the Champagne fair-wardens to pay a fair-debt appealed first to the Jours de Troyes and when that failed to the Parlement de Paris. 123 The fair-wardens' courts were thus fully integrated into the princely legal system.
Municipal courts in the Champagne fair-towns provided a second set of tribunals for merchants at the fairs. These town courts were integrated into the public legal system in multiple ways, since they were based on devolved jurisdictional rights granted by the prince, their judges often also held princely office, and litigants were entitled to appeal to princely courts. Town courts evidently offered an attractive alternative to the prince court system since, as we have seen, foreign merchants visiting the fairs voluntarily used them, arousing jurisdictional rivalry between the communes and princely prévots.
Municipal jurisdictions outside Champagne also contributed to enforcing faircontracts, since foreign merchants brought disputes to the courts of their own and their debtors' home cities. In 1230, for instance, a conflict over a debt incurred by Cambrai merchants with Bologna merchants at the Provins fair in 1213 was resolved before the local court of the archbishop of Cambrai, advised by municipal councillors attesting to the authenticity of the seal on the contract. 124 In 1279, a conflict over an unpaid fairdebt between Florentine and Piacenzan merchants was referred to 'the Potestà,
Captain, and council of the commune of Florence'. 125 In 1292 a group of Florentine merchants enforced payment of a fair-debt from a Venetian merchant in 1291 by mobilizing their own municipal jurisdiction to put pressure on the Venetian citycourt. 126 In 1294, the French king guaranteed Flemish merchants of the 'Seventeen Towns' frequenting the fairs the right to appeal to their own municipal jurisdictions. 127
In 1312, a Bolognese merchant pursued a fair-debt from a Florentine creditor through his own municipal jurisdiction and then the town court of Florence. 128 Revealed preference suggests that Italian and Flemish merchants regarded municipal jurisdictions, both in the fair-towns and in each other's home towns, as an effective way of enforcing international trading contracts.
The church offered a further source of public contract enforcement to merchants at the Champagne fairs. The fair-tribunals operated by local religious houses were integrated into the public legal system, through their basis in jurisdictional rights granted in princely charters and their manning partly by princely officials. Ecclesiastical tribunals also offered contract-enforcement to foreign merchants visiting the Champagne fairs in a wider, European forum. In principle, the medieval church exercised a jurisdiction which transcended territorial and linguistic frontiers, was recognized by temporal authorities throughout Christendom, and disposed of enviable moral suasion and a farflung network of personnel. Ecclesiastical jurisdictions were thus in a position to compete effectively with princely and municipal tribunals in enforcing international trading contracts. Until the 1270s, according to Bautier, merchants visiting the Champagne fairs were more likely to have commercial contracts sealed in church tribunals than by the fair-wardens. 129 This meant that any ensuing dispute over that contract would be referred to a church court. Appeals against the decision of a church court were referred to the Pope, who would delegate final judgment to an important cleric in Champagne, such as the dean of Bar or the prior of Saint-Ayoul in Provins.
The requirement to settle a fair-debt was usually accompanied by a sentence of papal interdict or excommunication in the event of further default. 130 The princely legal system itself recognized the importance of ecclesiastical jurisdictions in providing contract enforcement to long-distance merchants, as shown by the demands sent abroad by the Champagne fair-wardens pursuing defaulting debtors, which were explicitly addressed 'to all justices, as much of the church as secular ones, who see these present letters '. 131 The Champagne fairs thus clearly possessed public authorities with the willingness and capacity to provide contract-enforcement to international merchants, not only by witnessing and sealing commercial agreements but by adjudicating conflicts and enforcing compliance. This is not to deny any role for informal, reputation-based contract-enforcement mechanisms. Informal mechanisms are ubiquitous in all economies, and it is unlikely that they were absent from the Champagne fairs. But there were no private judges. Public courts with coercive powers were omnipresent at the Champagne fairs and played an important role in contract enforcement among merchants. The view that long-distance trade expanded in medieval Europe based solely on reputational mechanisms and private judges receives no support from the institutional arrangements at the Champagne fairs.
The Champagne Fairs and the 'Community Responsibility System'
The medieval Champagne fairs have also been mobilized in support of a second lesson for developing economies -the idea, advanced by Greif, that collective reprisals between corporative groups of businessmen can support impersonal exchange. 132 In this portrayal, courts with coercive powers did exist in medieval Europe, but were controlled by local interests which prevented them from protecting foreign merchants'
property rights or enforcing contracts impartially. According to Greif, the 'community responsibility system' stepped into the breach by providing incentives for local courts to supply impartial justice. If a member of one community defaulted on a contract with a member of another, and the defaulter's local court did not provide compensation, the injured party's local court would impose collective reprisals on all members of the defaulter's community, incarcerating them and seizing their property to secure compensation. The defaulter's community could only avoid such sanctions by ceasing to trade with the injured party's community. If this prospect was too costly, the defaulter's community had an incentive to provide impartial justice.
Greif claims that this combination of corporative justice and collective reprisals provided the institutional basis for international exchange in the early centuries of the Commercial Revolution, and that the Champagne fairs provide a prime example of the 'community responsibility system' in operation. He makes two main arguments concerning this second claim. The first is that the Champagne fairs did not have a legal system with jurisdiction over visiting merchants. The fair authorities, he claims, 'relinquished legal rights over the merchants once they were there. An individual was subject to the laws of his community -represented by a consul -not the laws of the locality in which a fair was held.' 133 His second argument is that the fair-wardens enforced merchant contracts by excluding defaulting debtors and all their compatriots 132 Greif (2002) , Greif (2006a) , Greif (2006b) . 133 Greif (2006a) In summary, only a minority of merchants at the fairs -the Italians and the Provençals -ever appointed consuls, and these did so only after 1245, sixty years after they had begun to trade at the fairs. Among those consuls, only some enjoyed jurisdictional powers immediately; others developed them only gradually or not at all. Those consular jurisdictions that did exist at the fairs could only be used to resolve conflicts within a particular community, not between members and outsiders. Even then, having a consul at the fairs did not exempt merchants from the jurisdiction of the count of Champagne or, after 1285, the king of France. Most importantly, the majority of merchants -including key groups such as the Flemish -never had their own community jurisdictions at the Champagne fairs.
What about the second argument, that contract enforcement at the Champagne fairs was supported by community-based collective reprisals? It is true that after 1260 the princely fair-wardens used a procedure against defaulting debtors that could culminate in collective reprisals. If a debt incurred at a fair was not repaid at the agreed time, the debtor was prosecuted in one of the various public courts available at the fairs provided he was still in Champagne. If he had left Champagne, his creditor could ask the princely fair-wardens to write to the authorities in the town where he was currently located, asking them to compel payment by either seizing his goods or sending him back to appear before the wardens. If the foreign authorities did not comply, the fairwardens could be asked to send further letters reiterating the request. After at least three letters, the fair-wardens could threaten the foreign authorities with a fair-ban excluding its merchants from future fairs and declaring their goods and bodies forfeit to repay the debt. Even at this stage, the foreign authorities could delay the ban by appearing before the fair-wardens and explaining why they could not enforce repayment. The foreign authorities could also appeal to higher courts -the Jours de 1279 153 ), or that the debtor had left town (as in Venice in 1299). 154 Others moved agonizingly slowly, with the London authorities putting the fair-wardens off for seven years between 1293 and 1300 155 and the Florentine authorities delaying them for four years between 1294 and 1298. 156 Some refused to to recognize the fair-wardens' competence, as in 1277 when the Parlement de Paris imprisoned the Champagne fair-wardens for exceeding their authority in demanding that the bailli of Vermandois appear in their court. 157 Flat refusals were not unknown, as in 1296-8 when the Florentine authorities told the fair wardens that they were too busy to concern themselves with an unpaid fair-debt. 158 Even when fair-bans were imposed, they could be avoided, as in 1264 when Cahors merchants attended the Champagne fairs despite a preceding fair-ban, 159 in 1297 when the captain of the universitas of Italian merchants frequenting the Champagne fairs mediated an agreement between creditors from Ypres and the Ricciardi firm of Lucca allowing the latter to attend the fairs despite the existence of a fair-ban against Lucca, 160 or in 1302 when the bishop of Paris paid a modest sum to various Piacenzan firms to annul a fairban requested against his subjects. 161 On the other hand, creditor merchants would not have paid the fair-wardens to undertake the elaborate documentary stages on the way to imposing a fair-ban had they not held some expectation of success. Hence it is reasonable to view the fair-ban procedure as having made some contribution to the ability of the Champagne fair-wardens to enforce merchant contracts, despite its recognized limitations.
But collective reprisals cannot have been the crucial contract-enforcement mechanism underlying the ascendancy of the Champagne fairs, since there is no evidence that fairbans were used to enforce merchant contracts in the period 1180-1260. There are only two mentions of fair-bans from the period before 1260: one in 1221 where the creditor was a sovereign prince and thus extraordinary 'diplomatic' guarantees were needed; and the other in 1242-3, which was to penalize violation of a safe conduct rather than a commercial contract. 162 The Champagne fairs thus flourished as the undisputed fulcrum of European international trade for eighty years, between c. 1180 and c. 1260, without using collective reprisals to enforce contracts.
This raises the question of what mechanism operated before 1260 to prevent fairdebtors from defaulting? A possible answer is that the Champagne fairs, as the most important international market in Europe, were the source of profitable trading opportunities that could not be replicated elsewhere. As we have seen, the fairs offered princely, municipal, and ecclesiastical courts with powers to compel merchants to fulfill contractual obligations while they were in Champagne. The only way a defaulting debtor could avoid prosecution was to avoid the fairs permanently, losing profitable trading opportunities. Provided that the benefit of absconding was lower than the cost of sacrificing future trading opportunities at the fairs, a merchant had an incentive to pay his debts. If this condition was met for the majority of merchants, then the combination of profitable trading opportunities and an effective legal system with coercive powers provides an explanation for why merchants at the Champagne fairs typically paid their debts rather than defaulting. The use of the fair-ban procedure against absconding debtors after 1260 may have provided an additional deterrent against default, but cannot have constituted the main reason why debts were typically paid. The Champagne fair-bans thus do not support the view that corporative contract 162 Bourquelot (1865), I:178-9, 193-4, 327-8. enforcement played a central role in the growth of international trade during the medieval Commercial Revolution.
Conclusion
The medieval Champagne fairs do hold lessons for the institutional foundations of impersonal exchange and long-distance trade, but not those for which they have often been mobilized. For one thing, they provide no support for the view that international trade developed on the basis of private-order legal provision. There were no 'private judges' at the Champagne fairs. Rather, the Champagne fairs offered an effective combination of state, ecclesiastical, and municipal courts, among which foreign merchants could (and did) shop around. This system was supplemented by a dedicated fair court, but its judges, the fair-wardens, were also princely officials and did not prevent foreign merchants from enforcing contracts at other levels of the princely justice-system, in front of courts operated by local abbeys, and in municipal courts.
Nor do the Champagne fairs support the idea that long-distance trade could develop on the basis of contract enforcement offered by collective reprisals among corporative communities of businessmen, in the absence of impartial public contract-enforcement.
The role of merchant 'communities' at the Champagne fairs was minimal. No merchants had them for the first 60 years of the fairs; many important groups of merchants at the fairs never had them at all; and even the few groups that did have them in later phases of the fairs' existence could only use them for internal contract enforcement and relied on the public legal system to enforce contracts between merchants of different communities. Collective reprisals were used in a limited way in the final phase of the fairs' ascendancy, after c. 1260, but they were fully integrated into the formal legal system, their enforcement relied on state coercion, and the few merchant 'communities' at the fairs played no role in initiating or implementing them.
What the Champagne fairs do show is that the policies and actions undertaken by the public authorities were crucial to impersonal exchange and international trade in medieval Europe. Between the 1180s and the 1290s, the rulers of Champagne provided security and contract enforcement to all merchants regardless of community affiliation: long-distance trade flourished and the Champagne fairs became the fulcrum of European trade. From the late 1290s, as the French crown ceased to provide generalized security and contract enforcement at the fairs, and instead began to tax and constrain particular groups of merchants to serve its fiscal, military and political ends, long-distance trade deserted Champagne and moved to centres such as Bruges where public goods were more impartially provided. The Champagne fairs succeeded because the public authorities provided generalized institutional services open to all traders; they declined when the regime switched to particularized institutional provision which discriminated in favour of (and against) specific groups of merchants.
